@musictechpolicy Podcast: Eight Mile Style Sues Spotify Under Music Modernization Act — Music Technology Policy

Chris Castle discussion of Eight Mile Style lawsuit against Spotify under Music Modernization Act (driving with dogs series, a One Take Wonder Production)

Eight Mile Style v. Spotify Complaint

@musictechsolve: Do Spotify Stock Downgrades Go Far Enough?

On June 24th, Spotify shares (ticker: SPOT) was downgraded by Evercore analyst Kevin Rippey, who cut the stock to Underperform from In Line.  Since then, analysts are steadily looking past the loss-making Spotify’s $1 billion stock buy back plan.

Rippey says investors are overestimating Spotify’s ability to make money from podcasts and offering services to musicians and are underestimating the competition from other streaming services—particularly in countries outside the U.S. He reduced his price target to $110.

As ARW readers will recall, I have long challenged Spotify’s kvetching about high royalty rates by pointing to the its high overhead, 7 figure performance bonuses to Daniel Ek when he failed to meet the bonus criteria, and other irresponsible behavior by the board that Ek controls.

Spotify’s interest in podcasts is another comical example of Ek as the Easter Bunny of Screw Ups.  He bought a podcasting company that was unionized.  Sheer genius.  Why did he buy them?  Some people think it’s because podcasts were another form of user-generated content where people work for free in exchange for hot meals…no, in exchange for exposure bucks.

Exposure Bucks

Apple is busy paying for podcasts according to Newsmax:

Apple Inc. plans to fund original podcasts that would be exclusive to its audio service, according to people familiar with the matter, increasing its investment in the industry to keep competitors Spotify and Stitcher at bay.

Executives at the company have reached out to media companies and their representatives to discuss buying exclusive rights to podcasts, according to the people, who asked not to be identified because the conversations are preliminary. Apple has yet to outline a clear strategy, but has said it plans to pursue the kind of deals it didn’t make before.

Apple all but invented the podcasting business with the creation of a network that collects thousands of podcasts from across the internet in a feed on people’s phones, smartwatches and computers. The Apple Podcast app still accounts for anywhere from 50% to 70% of listening for most podcasts, according to industry executives.

So Spotify’s law fare against Apple in Europe should come as no surprise (for more on that subject see the “Spotify Untold” corporate bio book).  What this comes down to is that once again, Apple understands its audience and what would delight them where Spotify wants to build them a faster horse (or at least a cheaper one).

Meanwhile, Spotify is commoditizing music into a “playlist friendly” environment based on your mood rather than being artist driven.  Why?  One possible reason is the psychographic research of Michael Kosinski, whose work formed the basis for techniques honed by Cambridge Analytica and the Internet Research Agency you hear so much about (although it must be said the Kosinski did not work for either of those outfits–no he works as a professor at…you guessed it…Stanford).  See his paper The Song Is You: Preferences for Musical  Attribute Dimensions Reflect Personality, available at the Leland Stanford Google University Business School.

The more insightful analysts are represented by Mr. Rippey, who seems to have a good grasp on Spotify’s business and sees through all the bright and shiny objects they want you to focus on as reported by Barrons (emphasis mine):

Rippey says Wall Street’s expectations assume that either the company will come out way ahead in negotiations with the music labels that control the vast majority of the content that Spotify streams, or that it will make a bundle of money from services that previously accounted for almost none of its income.

Now that the sugar high of the Spotify stock has passed through the system and artists either are happy or not happy with their share of the proceeds–which will be hitting royalty statements right about September 30–labels are now faced with a  second act, and that second act likely will require a bigger royalty check–not a smaller one.

To achieve Wall Street’s targets for gross profit, Spotify would either need to take a larger cut of proceeds from each song stream [also called a lower royalty to artists and songwriters] or generate as much as $650 million from “ancillary” areas like Spotify for Artists and podcasts by 2022—areas the company doesn’t make much money on today, Rippey says. Spotify for Artists offers data for musicians to track which songs are performing well and in which areas, among other benefits. [Which is OK if Spotify for Artists is free, I guess–since we sent them the fans–but my bet is that no one is going to pay for it, certainly no one with a modicum of leverage.]  Spotify makes money from ads on podcasts it owns and has also begun to launch exclusive podcasts that listeners can only get on Spotify.  [Spotify has never had a hit that originated entirely within Spotify.  When it does, check this space.]

Given that music crosses over multiple cultures but that Spotify brings a decidedly European and Anglo/American creative viewpoint to its distribution platform, it is unlikely to be able to fight all fights in all markets and be all things to all music fans in the some 60 countries it operates in.  This is particularly true in countries that actually value their culture and creators.

Spotify is the global leader in streaming music, but Rippey thinks that Wall Street overestimates the company’s power in local markets. “In emerging markets like India, local players dominate the market,” he writes, noting that Jio and Gaana were the market leaders there in the first quarter. “This fragmentation leads to an understatement of how competitive streaming music is globally.” Similar dynamics play out in countries like Indonesia too.

Those are some good concrete reasons why Rippey’s price target is $110, which I think is still about $50 too high because of Spotify’s C team management.  And also because the other analysts are all guiding too high in the Overton Window:

Analyst Rating Price Target
Evercore/Kevin Rippey Underperform (From In Line) $110
Nomura Instanet/M. Kelly Buy $190
Stifel/John Egbert Buy $175
Credit Suisse/B. Russo Underperform $120
BOA/Jessica Reif Ehrlich Buy $230

One major factor that all the analysts overlook, like they missed the subprime crisis, is buried in the commentary that never gets picked up in the Wall Street publications–the fact that artists can’t begin to make a living from streaming the way they could from the CDs that streaming is replacing.  This sudden contraction hurts artists at all stages of development.  To put it in terms that Wall Street might understand more readily, this is a supply chain issue.  The chain will have no supply if unsustainable economics expands which it seems like it will.

There’s about 5% of the tracks that make 90% of the revenue from Spotify-type streamers.  Fans are paying subscriptions every month for music they don’t listen to performed by artists they don’t like.  When that idea starts to permeate the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, who knows what may happen.  This will be true of podcasters, too–the unionized podcasters affiliated with the Writers Guild of America.  I’m looking forward to that collective bargaining experience.

But for now, it’s only a matter of time before artists who are not in that 5% start to jump ship.  Analysts should be asking, who can encourage them to jump and what will happen to the ship they jump from if there were some disruption below decks in the royalty rates?

@rmilneNordic: Spotify chief wins backing of business families for ‘creative Davos’

Just what we need, Spotify staging another fake songwriter “genius” event now that we made him even richer.  Make you feel better about the reaming we got on MMA?

The chief executive of Spotify is teaming up with some of Europe’s leading business families to finance an annual conference they hope could be a “creative Davos” with a focus on technology and innovation. Brilliant Minds, an event set up by Daniel Ek of music streaming company Spotify and Ash Pournouri, the ex-manager of the recently deceased DJ Avicii, is now owned and financed by a group of Swedish families including the Wallenbergs, Stenbecks and Olssons, whose companies include Ericsson, Electrolux, Kinnevik, Zalando and Stena.

Read the post on the Financial Times

@FeaturedArtist’s Lucie Caswell calls for “due reward” to artists from Spotify equity windfalls

[And what about the songwriters?]

As the trading floor eyes up Spotify’s float, the attention of the music industry is on its licensors. None more so than music makers, who created the assets which make Spotify and its rivals, the billion-dollar businesses they are today. In theory, those assets are due for a windfall as option agreements become exercisable and paper value crystallises into cash. This is potentially a moment which proves the extraordinary opportunities of our digital age, the borderless, boundless bounty of music, the leadership of music innovation and, the enormous value in this business we love, music.

Whose value and how much however, is the conversation of the day. Spotify floating as the New York Stock Exchange takes a hit, is hopefully not prescient of the rewards to the music value chain, through rights-owners and rights licensors who included equity in their licensing deals. Premium-priced initial sales would suggest otherwise. Those licensing deals intrinsically exist for the protection and monetisation of copyright – the music rights and songs artists entrusted to those licensors, for the best advantage to achieve fans and revenues. Rights-holders, distributors, aggregators and services like Spotify, all make money from that transaction and, that trust. Surely it is only sound business that the trust will be repaid and the creators receive due reward from those valuable assets, when money is made.  Whether marketing them, streaming them, building a business upon and around them or licensing them, this industry is sustained and sustainable only, with those songs and recordings.

How much value, will be a matter of the deal at hand and the hour at which the licensor cashes in (something which it seems, will be a tightrope dance of timing over the initial roller-coaster period of trading). From that point, the licensor must decide how to distribute the win across all of the assets it has licensed. Notice I say all. There is apparently some discussion of who should be included, of what repertoire may or may not feel the windfall and who is more valuable.

At this stage we point, as we have before, to the demonstrative WIN FairDigitalDeals Declaration. This landmark calling-card for fair play by rights-holders has come of age. Principle statements are now to become practice. This simple document, signed up to by a growing, global swathe of independent labels, is indicative of how good practice is the fair, transparent and creator-led business we strive for as the FAC.  Good players are many but they also provide precedent that business can be done with equal revenue shares, clear reporting and by fit for purpose, full and fair distribution of wealth to those who create it. Now is the time for all labels and licensors to really demonstrate good intent for artists, ensuring that our ecosystem is sustainable in practice and principled throughout.

Read the post in Music Week