@halsinger: As the Revolving Door Swings: Big Tech could be forestalling platform regulation in a stealthy way

Through a LinkedIn email, I learned that a recent staffer on the Senate Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee was recruited by Amazon’s public-policy arm this month. I took to Twitter to express my dismay, and quickly learned that another staffer on the Senate Judiciary Committee was recruited by Facebook’s competition policy arm in May 2020.

These two staffers are now working for the tech platforms, and presumably against my ideas, after having heard my ideas in a private setting.

It is important to note right here that I have no beef with these fine folks.

But  I do.

Read the post on The American Prospect.

Natasha Bernal: Clegg calls on Europe to drop threats to break up Facebook and unite against China

In The Grand Deflection category, mark your calendars: Where were you the first time you heard the word “tech lash”? They are the spin they’ve been waiting for.

Facebook hires former senior government officials to lobby for Facebook to use its tools for more surveillance capitalism by roiling against the surveillance state that uses their tools to perfect the totalitarian state.

Welcome to The Party.

[Sir Nick Clegg t]he former deputy prime minister [and now lobbyist for Facebook] has said the social network plans to set up an independent oversight board to which people can appeal against content decisions made by Facebook.  [But wait…they’re a platform…they’re a publisher…they’re a platform….]

He also defended the company, saying it was the victim of a “tech lash”.

Read the post on The Telegraph

@nickconfessore @laforgia_ gabriel-j-x-dance: Facebook offered users privacy wall, then let Spotify and other tech giants around it

For years, Facebook gave some of the world’s largest technology companies more intrusive access to users’ personal data than it has disclosed, effectively exempting those business partners from its usual privacy rules, according to internal records and interviews.

The special arrangements are detailed in hundreds of pages of Facebook documents obtained by The New York Times. The records, generated in 2017 by the company’s internal system for tracking partnerships, provide the most complete picture yet of the social network’s data-sharing practices. They also underscore how personal data has become the most prized commodity of the digital age, traded on a vast scale by some of the most powerful companies in Silicon Valley and beyond.

The exchange was intended to benefit everyone. Pushing for explosive growth, Facebook got more users, lifting its advertising revenue. Partner companies acquired features to make their products more attractive. Facebook users connected with friends across different devices and websites. But Facebook also assumed extraordinary power over the personal information of its 2.2 billion users — control it has wielded with little transparency or outside oversight.

The social network allowed Microsoft’s Bing search engine to see the names of virtually all Facebook users’ friends without consent, the records show, and gave Netflix and Spotify the ability to read Facebook users’ private messages.

Read the post on the New York Times.

@neilturkewitz: Disruption, Fear and Slippery Slopes: Baby Steps in Building a Better Internet

The biggest story of 2017? To my mind, there is no contest — the broad emergence of an awareness that the irresponsibility masquerading as Internet freedom represented a threat to global societies and to cherished aspects of our humanity, and that a course correction was badly needed.

While recognition of the fact that rewarding lack of accountability would likely incentivize anti-social and illegal conduct took longer than it should have, such an awareness came to fruition throughout 2017. Whether motivated by concerns about sex trafficking or the prevalence of other internet-enabled crimes, fake news, foreign government interference in elections, monopoly or monopsony power, or the perceived political or cultural biases of platforms, the question at the end of 2017 wasn’t whether the current legal framework for platform responsibility should be amended, but how.

It became clear that the twin pillars upholding the current lack of accountability in the internet ecosystem — Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and Section 512 of the DMCA, each of which was adopted at the dawn of the commercial internet, would need to be reexamined and a new framework established.

Read the post on Medium

@musictechpolicy: Facebook’s Music Licenses: What’s Not to Like?

Facebook pays no royalties for the music that gives significant value to the platform. That’s often a surprising proposition for artists and songwriters, much less the general public.

Yet it is true—hitmakers and new artists, pros and amateurs alike do not get a penny from Facebook and the company doesn’t even attempt to license their work. Why should a multibillion dollar multinational corporation that anchors a large piece of the Internet economy and whose founder is planning on running for President of the United States get to pay music makers in exposure bucks?

The answer is that Facebook, like YouTube and many other user-generated content platforms hide behind the legacy DMCA “safe harbor” and its nonnegotiable, unconscionable, adhesion contract that controls the use of its platform.

Rumor has it that Facebook is evidently coming to the table and is in at least semi-active negotiations with at least some labels and publishers.

One may well ask what took so long—but if it were not for Universal Music Group’s pursuit of Facebook’s infringements through DMCA notices, it’s likely that Facebook would be blithely rolling on its monopolist juggernaut.

On the other hand, this is actually a good time to be negotiating these deals give the Congressional scrutiny of Facebook’s involvement in the 2016 Presidential election campaigns. We have the benefit of public statements by Facebook representatives under oath regarding what they can do and what they so far refuse to do which may come in handy in licensing negotiations.

These negotiations with rights owners may result in what will seem like a very big pop of up-front cash—but is it? And whatever the number, how will that money be distributed to the artists and songwriters that make it happen?